




By way of public budgets is in economically 
developed countries redistributed approximately 
one half of the produced GDP. According to the 
EUROSTAT data (EUROSTAT, 2012), total 
government expenditures in the EU countries 
(EU-27) accounted in 2012 for 48.9 % of GDP, 
of which expenditures on the local governments’ 
level accounted for 11.5% of GDP. In the Czech 
Republic, these expenditures stood in 2012 
at 43.9% of GDP, while local governments’ 
spending accounted for 9.8% of GDP. A more 
detailed comparison of the ratio of total public 
expenditures to GDP and expenditures of local 
governments to GDP brings the following table.
Distribution of public expenditures between 
central and local governments depends on 
a type of the model of fi scal federalism adopted 
in individual countries. For most of the reviewed 
countries, we may register a decrease in public 
expenditures of local governments. The cause 
could be attributed to a drop in tax revenues due 
to the economic crisis. Local governments, unlike 
central governments, do not aim to stabilise the 
economy using a fi scal policy. With respect to 
the signifi cant volume of allocated resources, it 
is desirable to possess information on how are 
these incurred expenses economically treated. 
The present state of theoretical refl ection is such 
that examination of municipal expenditures is 
usually oriented towards analysing municipal 
expenditures related to a specifi c area, such 
as effi ciency in provision of municipal services 
(Pavel & Sičáková-Beblavá, 2009), in contracting 
DO THE DATA ON MUNICIPAL 
EXPENDITURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
IMPLY INCORRECTNESS IN THEIR 
MANAGEMENT?















Czech Republic 43.0% 11.3% 42.5% 10.8% 43.8% 9.8%
Slovakia 42.0% 7.3% 40.6% 6.8% 40.2% 6.4%
Slovenia 49.2% 9.8% 49.8% 9.4% 48.1% 9.5%
Hungary 49.7% 12.6% 49.9% 11.5% 48.7% 9.3%
Poland 45.9% 15.0% 43.9% 14.1% 42.9% 13.3%
Romania 39.6% 9.5% 39.2% 10.3% 36.4% 9.6%
Source: Eurostat (2012)
Tab. 1: Comparison of total government expenditures to GDP and expenditures of local governments to GDP in selected countries of Central Europe
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public services at a local level (Nemec, Ochrana, 
& Šumpíková, 2008), on analysis of municipal 
fi nances (Peková, 2011) and their indebtedness. 
In addition to these examinations, further ways 
are being sought with the aim to streamline 
outlays of municipal expenditures with 
a possibility of introducing public administration 
controlling (Štandová, Mihaliková, & Mitaťalová, 
2007) or indentifying suitable institutional forms 
(Beblavý & Šičáková-Beblavá, 2006) or forms 
of ownership in the provision of services. At the 
same time, it appears as necessary to look for 
ways of how to detect possible incorrectness in 
the management of municipal expenditures and 
how to improve the public expenditure control 
system. Towards one of the possible ways points 
also this study. Using Benford‘s test, it aims to 
examine expenditures of the Czech Republic’s 
municipalities recorded in 2012, analyse 
uncovered results and formulate conclusions 
with respect to a more effective operation of the 
control system of public expenditures. As far 
as our knowledge based on analysis of expert 
literature goes, Benford’s test has not yet been 
applied within the realm of control of public 
expenditures. The presented study attempts to 
carry out such an analysis (on the example of 
the Czech Republic’s municipal expenditures 
in 2012). The aim of this study is to explore by 
way of Benford’s test municipal expenditures of 
the Czech Republic that were undertaken within 
one reference year and based on results of the 
empirical research to carry out a discussion 
on the given issue and to formulate theoretical 
generalisations and practical recommendations 
for the domain of a control of public expenditures.
Criterion Type of control Subject of control Monitored indicator Monitoring question
Content focus
Content control Control of results (audit of results, performance audit)
Agreement between achieved 
results and specifi ed expenditure 
targets
How are performance indicators 
being met? How are met criteria 
of economy, effi ciency and 
effectiveness?
Formal control Control of receipts and legal review of documents 
Compliance with the Act on 
Accounting and legal compliance 
with expenditure documents
Are accounts and expenditure 
documents kept correctly from 
a formal aspect?
Time aspect
Preliminary Ex ante control of planned expenditure activities
Choice of the most appropriate 
allocation variant of public 
expenditures
Has the chosen variant 
been economically the most 
appropriate one?
Running 
Continuous monitoring of 
achieved results and control 
of receipts and documents
Continuous monitoring of meeting 
the predetermined indicators
Are the predetermined 
indicators being met at review 
time points? Do expenditure 




Concluding content and formal 
review of the undertaken 
expenditure activity 
Final control of the achieved results 
and the degree of compliance with 
accounting and legal practices
Do the fi nal results correspond 
with the planned objective? Are 
all the formal (accounting and 
documentation) procedures in 
accordance with the principles 
of accounting and the legal code?
Institutional
Internal control 
Content, formal, preliminary, 
running and concluding 
control by the institution itself
Indicators of the content and formal 
control listed above, monitored by 
an internal audit 
Do the controlled indicators 
correspond with the norm 
specifi ed by the Act on Financial 
Control and other relevant legal 
norms?
External control 
Content, formal, running and 
concluding control carried 
by an external independent 
institution – in CZE severely 
limited (by the Supreme Audit 
Offi ce) 
Indicators of the content and formal 
control as listed above, monitored 
by an external audit 
Do the controlled indicators 
correspond with the norm 
specifi ed by the Act on Financial 
Control?
Source: own based on Act No. 320/2001 Coll., On Financial Control in Public Administration
Tab. 2: General architecture of the control system of public expenditures (case of the Czech Republic)
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1. Theoretical Foundations of the 
Research
The starting point for control of public 
expenditures is a duly effective control system 
of public spending. The issue of a control of 
public expenditures has already been studied 
within expert literature for several decades. 
Authors usually devote in detail to a particular 
aspect of a control of public expenditures, 
such as e.g. the issue of a fi nancial control, 
audit of public sector organisations or program 
evaluation and performance measurement. 
Within countries of the former Eastern bloc 
emerges the issue of a control of public 
expenditures approximately for the past 
ten years (see e.g. Štangová, Mihaliková, 
& Mitaľová, 2007). Based on the analysis of 
a discussion on the issue of a control of public 
expenditures within expert literature and the 
existing control system of public expenditures in 
the Czech Republic, the system of a control of 
public expenditures may be characterised from 
different perspectives, as shown in Table 2. The 
table provides a synthesis of views on the issue 
of a control of public expenditures. As a starting 
point it takes the situation as within conditions 
of the Czech Republic specifi ed by the Act No. 
320/2001 Coll., On Financial Control in Public 
Administration.
From the content perspective, the control 
system of public expenditures focuses both 
on the economic aspect of spending activities 
(monitoring of the achieved results) as well as 
on the formal (accounting and documentation) 
verifi cation of the correctness of carried 
expenditure activities. From the time aspect, 
we distinguish between preliminary, running 
and fi nal inspection. It may be directed both 
to the area of auditing results of implemented 
spending activities as well as on a formal 
verifi cation of the correctness (accounting and 
documentary) of the way those expenditure 
activities are recorded. From the institutional 
point of view, the control may be carried 
either by the institution itself (internal control) 
or by an external institution. One problematic 
aspect, however, represents the fact that the 
control system of municipal expenditures 
has under the conditions of the Czech 
Republic its weaknesses and limitations. 
Municipal expenditures (as opposed to central 
government expenditures) can not be checked 
by the Supreme Audit Offi ce. On the part of 
the Supreme Audit Offi ce can be checked only 
those expenditures that local governments 
derive from the state budget. What is missing is 
thus one of important independent information 
channels that would serve a feedback on how 
were municipal expenditures implemented.
Another problem poses the fact that in the 
practice of control activity, there is established 
a relative separation of the content control 
from the formal control. The consequence is 
that both types of controls in question do not 
co-operate; respectively, they are often 
implemented separately (or independently). 
Expenditure controls usually either intentionally 
focus only on checking of economic results 
related to the undertaken expenditures, or 
concentrate purely on a verifi cation of the 
formal (accounting and documentation) 
correctness of the carried outlays. The fact that 
both types of control remain unlinked means 
some valuable information get lost or remain 
potentially unused while they could lead to an 
increase in effi ciency of the control system 
of public expenditures, exposure of formal 
and material errors in resource allocations 
or possible frauds and machinations in the 
management of public resources. Therefore, it 
is desirable to seek ways to contribute to a more 
effective control of public spending and to 
utilise acquired information in a comprehensive 
monitoring of expenditure activities. One 
of these ways may represent signalling of 
accounting and record-keeping irregularities in 
expenditure management activities, acquired 
through a formal control. This information may 
subsequently trigger a content control to review 
the economic rationality (economy, effi ciency 
and effectiveness) of the carried expenditures. 
One of the tools that are instrumental to acquire 
signalling information on possible errors in the 
management of public expenditures is the use 
of Benford’s test.
Benford’s Law builds on the idea of the “fi rst 
digit law”, formulated in 1881 by an American 
astronomer Simon Newcomb in the article 
entitled “Note on the Frequency of Use of the 
Different Digits in Natural Numbers” published 
in The American Journal of Mathematics. In this 
article he holds that the probability of the fi rst digit 
in a number being 1 is not 0.111 (1:9 = 0.1111) 
as might be expected, but rather 0.301. 
This proposition was rediscovered by Frank 
Benford and formulated in detail in the article 
“The Law of Anomalous Numbers” (Benford, 
1938). Benford supported his investigation by 
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an analysis of more than 20,000 data samples. 
Within his analysis, Frank Benford sought to 
utilise the widest possible data sources from 
random numbers, street numbers, lake surface 
areas, population data, or statistics from the 
American Basketball League (Nigrini, 2011).
Mathematical application of Benford’s Law 
is dealt with by Hill (1995a; 1995b; 1998) and 
Berger and Hill (2011). As fundamental may 
be considered the following theorem, based 
on the Central Limit Theorem: “Provided 
the chosen distribution is a random one and 
provided from any such a distribution we pick 
a random sample, signifi cant numbers from 
this distribution converge to the logarithmic 
distribution, alias Benford’s distribution”, as put 
by Hill (1998).
The probability of an occurrence of the fi rst 
digit D1 based on Benford’s distribution is:
 
(1)
The probability of an occurrence of the 
second digit D2 based on Benford’s distribution 
is:
       
(2)
If we extend our analysis to the occurrence 
of a number on the n-th position, we make use 
of the following general formula:
 
(3)
The fi rst application of Benford’s Law in the 
fi eld of accounting was performed by Carslaw 
(1988) who claimed that when the net income of 
a company is just below a given psychological 
level its managers will tend to round this income 
up. For example, if we have a net income of 
798,000 and 19.97 million, managers will try to 
round these numbers to the amount of 800,000 
and 20 million, respectively. This activity is 
understandable due to the management 
incentive programs. Carslaw claimed that this 
behaviour can be detected using Benford’s Law, 
i.e. within the data set there will be a higher 
occurrence of zeros in the second position 
and a lower incidence of the number 9 in the 
second position when compared to Benford’s 
distribution.
The research of Carslaw was followed by 
Thomas (Nigrini & Mittermaier, 1997) who 
examined rounding of tax losses in the USA. His 
further analysis focused on Earnings per Share 
(EPS), for which the number nine occurred on 
the last position less frequently than expected. 
This resulted in a claim that Earnings per Share 
are rounded up while losses are rounded 
down. In 1993, Gupta and Christian (Nigrini & 
Mittermaier, 1997) analysed data of taxpayers 
reported in tax returns. The study focused 
on taxpayers with an income less than USD 
100,000. Provided a taxpayer in this category 
reduces his income by a few dollars, he may 
fall into a lower tax rate bracket. The fi ndings 
uncovered an income misrepresentation by 
taxpayers who ranked on the border line for an 
increase in their marginal tax rate.
A signifi cant shift in the theory of Benford’s 
Law application in the domain of accounting 
fraud detection is credited to Nigrini (1993; 
1996; 2011). Nigrini in his fi rst study (Nigrini, 
1993) examined the fi rst and second digit 
in interests paid and interests credited on 
a sample of about 200,000 tax returns from 
1985 to 1988. The result was a bias towards 
lower numbers for interests accrued and higher 
numbers for interests paid. This research was 
followed by practical case studies of specifi c 
companies, such as the test of fi rst digits, 
second digits and fi rst two digits of invoices 
issued by an oil company in order to detect 
duplicates in documents. Another application 
was an analysis of rounding in numbers.
Examinations by Nigrini are summarised 
by Durtshi, Hillison and Pacini in their study 
“The Effective Use of Benford’s Law to Assist in 
Detecting Fraud in Accounting Data” (Durtschi, 
Hillison, & Pacini, 2004) where they also provide 
a guide for the application of Benford’s Law in 
forensic audit. Conclusions from the mentioned 
sources can be summarised into the following 
overview table (Tab. 3).
Results of this generalisation (see Tab. 3) 
related to conditions and instances of the use 
of Benford’s Law within the domain of a formal 
control (in this case accounting) will be adopted 
as a basis for an empirical analysis of aggregate 
data on municipal public expenditures in the 
Czech Republic.
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Nr. Data for the use of Benford’s Law  should satisfy the following conditions Nr.
Benford’s law can be used to detect the 
following data manipulations
1 All data in the data set must be recorded in the same unit 1
Rounding of economic performance by 
managers, e.g. rounding of profi t from 
789,000 to 800,000
2 Data must not be limited by their maximum and minimum value 2
Upward rounding of net income and EPS 
(earnings per share) 
3
Data can not be numbers used for 
identifi cation purposes and they are not 
generated randomly
3 Downward rounding of losses
4 Data should consist of rather small values 4 Duplicity of fi nancial fi gures, e.g. invoices
5 It is advisable to have larger data sets 5 Wiping data off
6 Data should not be infl uenced by a psychology, e.g. pricing ending with 99 6
Rewriting fi gures
Source: own based on Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997); TPA Horwath (2011)
Study # 1 Study # 2 Study # 3
Name of 
the study
On the Application 
of Benford’s Law 
to International 
Macroeconomic Statistics
Benford’s Law and 
Macroeconomic Data 
Quality






Tests of data on the 
development of GDP 
in OECD countries and 
Africa.
Macroeconomic data of 80 
countries and comparison 
of results with an alternative 
method of assessment of 
the macroeconomic data 
quality – the IMF‘s Data 
Assessment Framework.
National accounts of the 
EU MSs on data related to 
compliance with the SGP: 
(1) Government defi cit 
and debt, (2) Government 
revenue, expenditures and 
main aggregates, (3) GDP, 




(1) Most of the data 
converged to Benford’s 
distribution.
(2) Benford’s test may 
serve as an indicator 
of poor quality and 
manipulations with data.
(1) Data for some countries 
did not converge to Benford’s 
distribution despite the fact 
that their statistical data 
were on the basis of the IMF 
ranking marked as good 
(Japan, Finland).
(2) Non-conformity with 
the test may be caused 
e.g. by structural changes 
in the economy, seasonal 
adjustments, etc.
(1) The largest deviations from 
Benford’s distribution indicated 
data for Greece and Lithuania 
while the lowest deviation 
recorded data for the Czech 
Republic (tested for the fi rst 
time) and Poland.
(2) Benford’s test can be used 
as a fi rst instance test that may 
indicate data manipulations.
Source: own based on Nye and Moul (2007); Gonzales and Pastor (2009); Rauch et al. (2011)
Tab. 3: Terms and examples of use of Benford’s Law in accounting
Tab. 4: Conclusions from the analysis of studies applying Benford’s Law on the control of macroeconomic data
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Within the scope of Benford’s Law 
application on macroeconomic data, there 
were published three major studies. In the fi rst 
study “On the application of Benford’s Law 
to International Macroeconomic Statistics” 
Nye and Moul (2007) focus on tests of data 
related to the development of GDP in OECD 
member states and Africa. In the second study 
(“Benford’s Law and Macroeconomic Data 
Quality”), its authors Gonzales and Pastor 
(2009) focus on testing of macroeconomic data 
collected from 80 countries while the results 
were compared with an alternative method of 
assessment of the macroeconomic data quality, 
the IMF’s Data Assessment Framework, based 
on which are compiled rankings of countries 
according to the quality of statistical data (Data 
Dissemination Reports on the Observance 
Standards and Codes). The last published 
study (Rauch, Göttsche, Brähler, & Engel, 2011) 
examined national accounts of the EU member 
states on data related to the performance of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The authors formed 
a ranking of countries based on the average 
deviation of x2 test results. Comparison of these 
studies and their conclusions are summarised 
in Table 4.
Authors of all three studies agree that the 
application of Benford‘s test on macroeconomic 
data may help to identify data with a higher 
probability of data manipulation. At the 
same time, however, it is necessary to take 
into account also the constraints that from 
this adoption arise. These include primarily 
erroneous results due to structural changes in 
the economy, adjustments for seasonality and 
macroeconomic transformations. Conclusions 
of these studies are relevant for interpreting 
results of empirical examinations that use 
Benford’s Law.
In addition to the above-mentioned adoption 
within the domain of accounting, auditing and 
analysis of macroeconomic data, application 
of Benford’s Law was also tested in analysing 
results of the elections in the USA (Decker, 
Myagkov, & Ordeshook, 2011), in fi scal (tax) 
control (Watrin, 2008), insurance (Maher 
& Akers, 2002) and also in verifying credibility of 
regression coeffi cients in scientifi c articles, as 
reported by Diekmann (2007), Diekmann and 
Jann (2010) and Tödter (2009). In the literature, 
we were unable to identify any application of 
Benford’s test on a lower than macroeconomic 
level, e.g. within the domain of municipalities. 
This study, therefore, likely stands to be the fi rst 
examination that audits municipal expenditures 
using Benford’s Law.
2. Results of the Empirical Research
The research focused on examination of data 
from municipalities in the Czech Republic. To 
be specifi c about the general characteristics of 
the object of investigation, let us observe that 
as of December 31, 2012, there were in total 
6,246 municipalities in the Czech Republic with 
10,503,477 inhabitants, while in municipalities 
over 2,000 inhabitants there lived in total 
73.2% of the overall population. Management 
of municipalities is in the Czech Republic 
governed by their annual budget and the budget 
outlook, as specifi ed by the Act No. 250/2000 
Coll., On Budgetary Rules of Regional Budgets. 
Within the research, we have worked along the 
lines of the binding classifi cation of municipal 
budgets – the budgetary structure, specifi ed 
by the Regulation of the Ministry of Finance 
of the Czech Republic No. 323/2002 Coll., 
On Budgetary Structure. Description of public 
administration reforms in the Czech Republic is 
provided e.g. in (Špaček & Neshybová, 2010).
For the purposes of empirical analysis were 
used aggregate data sourced from the Ministry 
of Finance of the Czech Republic. The data 
refer to the year 2012 and represent sums 
of public expenditures in the structure of the 
statement of budgetary execution and control of 
all municipalities in the Czech Republic, divided 
into categories according to the population (see 
Tab. 5). For the data analysis there were used 
statistical methods, hypothesis testing, linear 
regressions and comparisons. The aim was 
to examine whether aggregate data on public 
expenditures of municipalities in the Czech 
Republic converge to Benford’s distribution. 
For this purpose, municipalities in the Czech 
Republic were divided into 12 categories 
according to the size of their population, as 
shown in Table 5.
Aggregation of data using the respective 
size of municipalities was chosen for two 
reasons. The fi rst reason is the fact that with 
regard to the total number of municipalities in the 
Czech Republic (6,246 municipalities), within 
this study it was not practicable to examine all 
expenditures for all municipalities. The second 
reason for opting for an aggregation was the 
fact that size-categories of municipalities allow 
benchmarking and therefore make it possible to 
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compare the test results of a specifi c municipality 
with results of a particular municipality size-
category. The aim was to test the hypothesis 
that aggregate data on municipal expenditures 
converge to Benford‘s distribution.
Data for the year 2012, requested from the 
Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, were 
structured based on sections of the sectoral 
breakdown, where each section contained all 
items based on class breakdown that have over 
the period reported some movement (i.e. at 
least one municipality included in the respective 
size-category has accounted for this item). Until 
2012, reporting of the public sector in the Czech 
Republic has been based on the so-called 
Cash Principle. This approach differs from 
the practice in Western countries (e.g. United 
Kingdom, Finland, Switzerland) where are put 
higher demands on the explanatory power of 
accounting statements of the public sector, as 
shown by Sinervo (2014), Lombrano and Zanin 
(2013) and Bergman (2012). Transition from 
cash-based accounting of the public sector 
towards accrual accounting is one of the core 
tools of public fi nancial management reforms 
in line with the philosophy of the New Public 
Management (Hood, 1995).
Within the fi rst part of the empirical analysis, 
we have verifi ed on aggregate data whether the 
data on municipal public expenditures converge 
to Benford’s distribution. The test criterion is 





AP – proportion of occurrence of individual 
numbers in the empirical distribution,
EP – proportion of occurrence of individual 
numbers in Benford’s distribution,
K – number of digits.
The following Table 6 shows critical MAD 
values for empirical data, based on which we 
can decide on the conformity with Benford’s 
distribution – 3 degrees of conformance, the 
fourth one for nonconformity. These values 
Nr.
Municipal size-ca-















1 0-100 477 7.64% 34,406 0.33% 72
2 101-200 1,001 16.03% 149,812 1.43% 150
3 201-500 2,007 32.13% 656,988 6.25% 327
4 501-1,000 1,362 21.81% 960,870 9.15% 705
5 1,001-2,000 726 11.62% 1,016,461 9.68% 1,400
6 2,001-5,000 400 6.40% 1,215,137 11.57% 3,038
7 5,001-10,000 142 2.27% 971,336 9.25% 6,840
8 1,0001-20,000 68 1.09% 954,676 9.09% 14,039
9 20,001-50,000 42 0.67% 1,217,062 11.59% 28,978
10 50,001-100,000 16 0.26% 1,137,171 10.83% 71,073
11 100,001-1,000,000 4 0.06% 947,894 9.02% 236,974
12 1,000,001+ 1 0.02% 1,241,664 11.82% 1,241,664
 Total 6,246 100.00% 10,503,477 100.00% 1,682
Source: Data on the number of municipalities from the Czech Statistical Offi ce. Table and calculations by authors.
Tab. 5: Number of tested data in municipality-size categories
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were derived from empirical studies by Nigrini 
(2011).
Results broken down by municipal size-
categories are listed in Table 7.
MAD values are also shown in the following 
chart. Research results given in Table 7 and 
Figure 1 indicate that the data on public 
expenditures of municipalities in the Czech 
Republic converge to Benford’s distribution. 
Eight size-categories (including the City of 
Prague) recorded the value of MAD at the level of 
“close conformity” and three categories ranked 
as “acceptable conformity”. Larger, but still 
acceptable level of deviation from logarithmic 
distribution recorded only data for the size-
category of municipalities with a population 
from 100,001 to 1,000,000 inhabitants (“lower 
conformity”). This group includes four cities.
3.  Application of Benford’s Test on 
the Data of Czech Cities for 2012
The third objective of the research was to 
conduct an empirical analysis of municipal 
expenditures in 2012 and to analyse the results 
/ draw conclusions applicable for the control of 
public expenditures at the level of municipalities 
of the Czech Republic. The test hypothesis 
was that based on the analysis of content and 
structure of the statement of execution and 
control of city budgets, Benford’s test should 
(most likely) identify statements of cities with 
types of data manipulations and errors such 
as rewriting numbers, duplicities, rounding of 
numbers, wiping off data.
Given the specifi c nature of the public sector 
and the character of reported statements it 
can be assumed that Benford’s test should be 









tested data MAD value
Order based 
on MAD Assessment verdict
0-100 1,404 0.006941550 10 Acceptable conformity
101-200 2,446 0.004812095 5 Close conformity
201-500 4,203 0.003228490 1 Close conformity
501-1,000 4,679 0.005652321 6 Close conformity
1,001-2,000 4,371 0.006520248 9 Acceptable conformity
2,001-5,000 4,866 0.004004314 3 Close conformity
5,001-10,000 4,374 0.003456433 2 Close conformity
10,001-20,000 3,870 0.004362737 4 Close conformity
20,001-50,000 3,518 0.005951687 7 Close conformity
50,001-100,000 2,950 0.007030236 11 Acceptable conformity
100,001-1,000,000 2,434 0.012114151 12 Lower conformity
1,000,001 and more 2,365 0.005994241 8 Close conformity
Source: own
Tab. 6: Critical MAD values for the fi rst number
Tab. 7: Results of Benford’s test applied to aggregate data on municipal public expen-ditures in the Czech Republic according to size-categories based on population
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able to detect intentional shifts of expenditures 
between individual budget headings. This 
activity may be aimed at covering e.g. 
administrative misconducts of breaching the 
budgetary discipline. Another motive may be an 
attempt to move items between the operating 
and investment parts of the budget in an effort 
to improve operating results and thus meet the 
evaluation criteria for securing a bank loan. 
Another motive may be of a purely political 
nature, e.g. an attempt to cover up expenses for 
legal and other consulting services (see fi ndings 
of the Supreme Audit Offi ce for the period from 
August to September 2013). The reason for such 
a data manipulation is to “protect itself” from 
a negative public reaction towards expenditures 
related to outsourcing of legal and consulting 
services by public administration institutions.
For further testing were used data from 
all municipalities in the Czech Republic with 
a city status. In total, analysed were public 
expenditures in the statement of budgetary 
execution and control of all 602 Czech cities for 
the year 2012.
On the empirical data was applied the 
fi rst-level test, i.e. for convergence towards 
Benford’s distribution was tested the fi rst 
number. This test is generally regarded as the 
most informative one (Nigrini, 2011). When 
analysing the convergence of empirical data 
towards Benford’s distribution, we can utilise 
primarily tests of goodness of fi t (Chi-square 
test, Z-test, Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test). 
However, these tests are affected by the 
number of data records (Nigrini, 2011) and at 
lower numbers of records their values may 
be distorted. To avoid a possible distortion 
of results due to a low number of records, 
we have used as a test criterion the value of 
Mean Absolute Deviation. The results of Mean 
Absolute Deviation, however, correlate with the 
results of tests of goodness of fi t.
Based on previous fi ndings, we have applied 
Benford’s test on statements of budgetary 
Fig. 1: MAD values for individual municipal categories
Source: own
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execution and control of individual cities in the 
Czech Republic. The results are summarised in 
the following Table 8.
Summary results are presented in Fig. 2.
According to the results presented in the 
following table, the application of Benford’s 
test shows a considerable instability. Data 
in the statements of 47.7% Czech cities did 
not converge towards Benford’s distribution. 
This result certainly can not be interpreted in 
a sense that 47.7% of statements contained 
manipulated data. It is only possible to assert 
that for the given controlled entities (cities), 
there can be expected existence of a higher 
probability of errors or data manipulations.
To analyse causes of these results, we 
sought to identify dependence of Benford’s test 
results on the size of the given city (in terms 
of its population) and dependence of results 
on the number of tested data (i.e. the number 
of items in statements). In order to achieve 
a greater explanatory power, we have removed 
from the analysis outliers that were recorded 
by the cities with largest populations (Prague, 
Brno and Ostrava).
The tests have shown a signifi cant 
dependence of MAD on the number of tested data 
and on the size of cities. Pearson’s correlation 
coeffi cient reached the value of -0.4587 for the 
number of tested data and -0.2095 for the city 
Degree of conformity Number of cities Share in %
Close conformity 6 0.997
Acceptable conformity 126 20.930
Lower conformity 183 30.399
Nonconformity 287 47.674
Source: own
Tab. 8: Summary results of an application of Benford’s test on individual cities in the Czech Republic
Fig. 2: Summary results of Benford’s test
Source: own
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size. Provided we include in our calculations 
also the cities of Prague, Brno and Ostrava, 
we still arrive at statistically signifi cant results. 
Pearson’s correlation coeffi cient reaches the 
value of -0.147205 for the size of a municipality 
and -0.390394 for the number of records.
Data were also subjected to a regression 
analysis, where we tried to explain the 
behaviour of the dependent variable MAD in 
response to changes in the above mentioned 
factors. The research results are shown in 
Table 9 and Table 10.
Although the factors “population” and 
“number_of_data” represent, based on the 
p-value, signifi cant explanatory variables, there 
still remains unexplained a signifi cant part of 
the MAD behaviour. To fi nd out the causes 
of deviations of data for individual cities from 
Benford’s distribution, it would be necessary 
to carry out the analysis of data and public 
expenditures directly on the spot. At the same 
time, it is also necessary to take into account 
possible signifi cant changes in the structure of 
expenditures between the years 2011-2012. 
Such an analysis, however, is outside the scope 
of ambitions of the presented study, as it would 
require signifi cant research implementation 
costs. Nevertheless, based on the examination 
carried out it is possible to conclude that the 
results support an argument that Benford’s 
test is appropriate for larger data samples 
(Nigrini, 2011). At the same time, we face the 
same problems as earlier studies by Nye and 
Moul (2007), Gonzales and Pastor (2009), 
Rauch et al. (2011).
Although Benford’s test focuses on the 
formal aspect of control activity of public 
expenditures when it e.g. allows detecting 
intentional shifts between individual budget 
chapters, such information still provides 
an impetus for examining the allocative 
effi ciency of public expenditures. That is, the 
aforementioned shift in expenditures actually 
represents a change in the purpose of public 
expenditures and its examining in turn falls 
under the domain of economic (content) control 
(see Tab. 2).
Benford’s test may indicate also other 
violations of effectiveness in incurred 
expenditures, represented by a transfer of 
items between current and capital expenditures 
in order to improve the image of the municipal 
economic management so as to meet the 
bank criteria to secure a loan. It can also 
Coeffi cient Std. error t-stat p-value
Const 0.0231963 0.000626024 37.0533 <0.00001
Population 5.93548e-08 1.65552e-08 3.5853 0.00036
Number_of_data -3.24696e-05 2.73206e-06 -11.8846 <0.00001
Adjusted coeffi cient of determination 0.224474
P-value (F) 4.64e-34
Source: own
Coeffi cient Std. error t-stat p-value
Const 0.0223251 0.000571761 39.0461 <0.00001
Population 3.84603e-08 5.37213e-09 7.1592 <0.00001
Number_of_data -2.81572e-05 2.28721e-06 -12.3107 <0.00001
Adjusted coeffi cient of determination 0.216610
P-value (F)  6.50e-33
Source: own
Tab. 9: Results of regression analysis (omitting extreme values of Prague, Brno and Ostrava), observations used: 1–599; dependent variable: MAD
Tab. 10: Results of regression analysis (including extreme values of Prague, Brno and Ostrava), observations used: 1–602; dependent variable: MAD
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lead to shifts between individual items for 
other reasons, such as, for example, when 
the municipal management tries to use shifts 
between individual items of expenditure types 
to hide from public criticism towards a certain 
type of spending activities. Also in this case, the 
original intent (purpose) of the expenditure is 
being violated. As evident, Benford’s test can 
be one of supporting tools of streamlining the 
system of control of public expenditures. Its 
application points at the possibility of systemic 
interconnection of individual types of municipal 
expenditure controls into a comprehensive, 
complex control system of public expenditures, 
as presented in Table 2.
The performed analysis shows that the 
aggregate data for municipalities, assembled 
into individual categories, converge to 
Benford‘s distribution (see Tab. 7). Application 
of Benford’s test on statements of budgetary 
execution and control of individual Czech cities 
results in highly unstable results. Based on the 
correlation analysis, we may conclude that there 
is a signifi cant correlation between the values 
of MAD and the number of surveyed data. 
This means that Benford’s test has a greater 
explanatory power when applied to a larger 
volume of data, as evident from the case of 
larger cities. This argument is consistent with 
other empirical analyses by Nigrini.
The undertaken research indicates that, 
in addition to errors and data manipulations 
already specifi ed in the literature, Benford’s 
test may also be adopted for a check against 
manipulations and data shifting between 
individual budgetary chapters, which could give 
a signal to supervisory authorities on a possible 
(probable) risk of a breach of budgetary 
discipline.
However, the empirical analysis has shown 
considerable limitations in the application 
options of Benford’s test, especially due 
to instability of the results, unavailability of 
suitable data, the need to transform data 
before applying the test and a risk of distortion 
of the results due to incorrect choice of test 
statistics. Certain restrictions for the use of 
Benford’s test represent also the current 
level of knowledge and generalisation of its 
application onto different types of data and 
accounting statements. In its application, it is 
therefore necessary to take into consideration 
other possible factors that may affect the 
quality of data, such as structural changes in 
the economy, specifi cs, and characteristics of 
individual sectors.
Despite the aforementioned problems, 
Benford’s test may still prove useful to the staff 
of internal audit and control departments as 
one of supporting tools that may within data 
analysis warn against likely occurrences of data 
manipulation. Subsequently, we may examine 
whether or not there came to a violation of the 
principle of effective management of public 
expenditures. This procedure can also be used 
as a tool to indicate possible fraud in the normal 
course of business of organisational units of the 
public sector (e.g. when examining incoming 
and outgoing invoices, donations, etc.). 
Benford’s test thus becomes a suitable tool for 
boosting the effi ciency of the public expenditure 
control system, when within the fi rst stage it 
allows to identify “problem” subjects, towards 
which may subsequently focus an in-depth 
control of public expenditures. Using Benford’s 
test can thus contribute towards fi nding the 
ways of how to achieve savings and reduce 
waste in the public sector (Půček & Ochrana, 
2014), improve the performance of public 
administration (TPA HORWATH, 2011) and to 
create an effective system of control of public 
expenditures.
Conclusions
The study aimed at adopting the Benford‘s test 
to examine municipal expenditures in the Czech 
Republic for one reference period (year 2012) 
and based on the empirical analysis to carry out 
a discussion on the given issue and to formulate 
relevant theoretical generalisations for the 
domain of a control of public expenditures. 
The empirical analysis has confi rmed our 
assumption that Benford’s test may be adopted 
also for examination of municipal expenditures. 
Nevertheless, there need to be constantly 
kept in mind the inherent limits of this method. 
Results of the applied Benford’s test show that 
this test is a suitable tool for the initial detection 
of data with a higher probability of incorrectness 
in the handling with public expenditures. We 
therefore recommend incorporating Benford’s 
test into the system of a control of public 
expenditure as specifi ed in Table 2. The main 
contribution of Benford’s test for the system for 
a control of public expenditure is an increase 
in effi ciency and reduction in costs associated 
with control activities. This way, the controlling 
body may focus on subjects that prove a higher 
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degree of risk of data tempering. A prerequisite, 
however, is the ability to analyse, evaluate and 
handle the risk by the controlling body.
The research is a result of the project P–17 
“Science of a society, politics and media within 
challenges of the time” by Faculty of Social 
Sciences, Charles University in Prague.
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DO THE DATA ON MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
IMPLY INCORRECTNESS IN THEIR MANAGEMENT?
Milan Půček, Michal Plaček, František Ochrana
Limited public resources confront public administration bodies with the question of how to handle 
them in an economically rational manner. Audit of public expenditures necessitates an ongoing 
creation and modifi cation of an effective control system. Such a system is made up by subsystems 
of a formal (accounting and documentation) and economic control, responsible for monitoring 
the effi ciency, effectiveness and economy of managing public expenditures. Signifi cance of such 
interconnection rests in the fact that the formal control may signal possible improper management 
of public expenditures. This may become a stimulus for the economic control subsystem to verify 
the effectiveness, effi ciency and economy of outlaid expenditures. For identifi cation purposes 
related to potential accounting and record-keeping incorrectnesses in the management of public 
expenditures is proposed adoption of Benford’s Law (Benford’s test). Benford’s test is applied on 
municipal expenditure data for the year 2012. Data represent sums of public expenditures in the 
structure of the statement of budgetary execution and control specifi ed by the Regulation of the 
Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic No. 323/2002 Coll. For the data analysis there were used 
statistical methods, hypothesis testing, linear regressions and comparisons. Although the empirical 
analysis points at a limited use of Benford’s test in the conditions of municipal expenditures in the 
Czech Republic (mainly due to the instability of results and unavailability of suitable data), the 
analysis showed that Benford’s test can be adopted as a supporting tool, suitable for building into 
the control system of public expenditures. It is one of the ways to increase the effectiveness of 
a complex control of public expenditures.
Key Words: Control of public expenditures, municipal expenditures, manipulation of public 
expenditure data, Benford’s Law, Benford’s test as a signalling tool for auditing public expenditures.
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